NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.

JAN 16 2009

COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION TWO

THE STATE OF ARIZONA,		
,		) 2 CA-CR 2008-0136
	Appellee,	) DEPARTMENT A
V.		) MEMORANDUM DECISION
••		Not for Publication
DANIEL MERCADO,		) Rule 111, Rules of
		) the Supreme Court
	Appellant.	)
		_)

## APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GILA COUNTY

Cause No. CR20060483

Honorable Robert Duber II, Judge

## **AFFIRMED**

Emily Danies

Tucson
Attorney for Appellant

ESPINOSA, Judge.

Following a jury trial, Daniel Mercado was convicted of resisting arrest. The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Mercado on probation. Subsequently, the state filed a petition to revoke probation and, after a violation hearing, the trial court found the state had proven Mercado had committed the "new offense[] of Domestic Violence Disorderly Conduct." The court revoked Mercado's probation and sentenced him to a presumptive, one-year term of imprisonment, with credit for ninety-three days' presentence incarceration. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Quantification Counsel has filed a brief in compliance with *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and *State v. Clark*, 196 Ariz. 530, 2 P.3d 89 (App. 1999). Mercado has not filed a supplemental brief. As requested, and pursuant to our obligation under *Anders*, we have reviewed the entire record for fundamental error, including the issue counsel identified as possibly "provid[ing] the appearance of an arguable issue."

State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, ¶ 3, 996 P.2d 113, 114 (App. 1999), the evidence supported the court's finding that Mercado had committed disorderly conduct against his mother by engaging in "loud and offensive name calling," failing to leave his mother's residence when she told him to go, and throwing a telephone. See A.R.S. § 13-2904. Mercado's probation included a condition that he "obey all laws." The court acted well within its discretion by revoking Mercado's probation and sentencing him to the presumptive prison term. See A.R.S. § 13-917(B) (trial court may revoke probation in its discretion and impose prison term as authorized by law); Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, ¶ 3, 996 P.2d at 114 (unless trial court's finding that defendant violated probation "is arbitrary or unsupported by any theory of evidence," reviewing court will not disturb ruling). Having found no fundamental, reversible error, we affirm the trial court's revocation of Mercado's probation and the prison term imposed.

j	PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge
CONCURRING:	
JOHN PELANDER, Chief Judge	
IOSEPH W HOWARD Presiding Judge	